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Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids:
Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy 
Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
Economía del comportamiento y ayudas públicas del Estado: ¿Por qué los iraníes se negaron a 
renunciar al recibo del subsidio gubernamental? (Un juego múltiple del dilema del prisionero)
ABSTRACT
This article uses the game theory, more specifically multiple prisoner’s dilemma game, to analyze why 
Iranians refused to give up on receiving public subsidies in April 2014, in spite of frequent requests of 
the government. Sample of study consists of two main groups: the ones who were not dependent on 
government subsidy but were applying for it; and the ones who did not depend either but had fraudulently 
pretended to depend on government subsidy. some suggestions are presented such as to define chicken 
game and not prisoner’s dilemma game as the main game.
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RESUMEN
Este artículo utiliza la teoría de juegos, más específicamente el juego múltiple del dilema del prisionero, 
para analizar por qué los iraníes se negaron a renunciar a recibir subsidios públicos en abril de 2014, 
a pesar de las frecuentes solicitudes del gobierno. La muestra de estudio consta de dos grupos 
principales: los que no dependían del subsidio del gobierno, pero que lo solicitaban; y los que tampoco 
dependían, pero habían fingido fraudulentamente depender del subsidio del gobierno. Se presentan 
algunas sugerencias, tales como definir el juego de la gallina y no el juego del dilema del prisionero 
como juego principal.
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INTRODUCTION
The 10th administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran started implementing a 
subsidy reform scheme in the form of monthly cash handouts (IRR 45,000 per 
person) in 2010. The second phase of the subsidy reform scheme stipulated that the 
government would continue paying cash handouts exclusively to needy people. To 
that effect, the 11th administration in April 2014 started registering applicants for 
government subsidy on the website www.refah.ir where every applicant was required 
to a. make clear whether or not he owned a residential unit; b. specify his household 
average income ranking among five groups starting from below IRR 6,000,000 
million to over IRR 25,000,000 (the average income of all household members); c. 
fill out the forms only if he was in need; d. have supporting documents to produce if 
need be; e. accept to restitute cash received and pay fines equaling up to three times 
the sums received in case of fake information; and f. have his record recognized as 
the basis for financial capacity in receiving banking facilities. 
The government initially expected deciles with higher incomes to not register as 
they had housing and high income to free up money to be paid to needy deciles. But in 
reality it did not happen2. Of 77 million Iranians, only 2.4 million (3.1%) withdrew their 
application for government subsidy. In other words, if we consider each household 
to have four members and parents have a final say, approximately 1.2 million 
Iranian adults dropped their application for monthly cash handouts. Therefore, the 
problem may be stated as follows: “Why did a large segment of people, who were 
not dependent on government subsidy, register despite government expectations 
(at least 10 million withdrawals)?”
More precisely, the three following parameters were involved in the application of 
such large numbers of people for government subsidy. 
First is economic deterioration and widespread poverty in Iranian society in 
the years leading to 2013 as opinion polls highlight people’s discontent with the 
economic situation;
Second is government-people difference in the definition of wealth, specifically 
from the standpoint that ownership of a residential unit does not necessarily imply 
wealth and cannot indicate owner’s affordability;
Third is “mental welfare” or people’s self-assessment of their status of life (Ghaffari, 
2014; 97) as people, despite running an honorable life, still consider themselves to 
depend on government subsidy. Such “excessive demand” and “irregular avarice and 
acquisitiveness”, which must be distinguished from entrepreneurship, was a direct 
impact of wealth show in the society (television serials and films as well as bank 
prizes) and the previous administration’s indiscreet pledge to give each Iranian 
household a 1,000-square meter villa. Therefore, one may have honestly declared 
2 There is evidence of lack of cooperation with the 10th administration, but no reliable data was 
found. 
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his income, but contrary to government’s view, considers himself to depend on 
government subsidy3.
These three aspects provide only partial answer to the problem. The question in 
this article is not about withdrawal or non-withdrawal of application for government 
subsidy; rather, it targets a lie expressed by people regarding their ownership of 
housing and monthly salary of over IRR 25 million when registering on the website. 
There is not clear information available on data entered by people. However, 50% of 
applicants had reportedly declared not having a residential unit while according to 
the National Statistic Center in 2011, only 26.6% of Iranians live in rented houses and 
70% of Iranians have their own private housing or live gratuitously in a residential 
unit which is not theirs. Furthermore, an MP, asked about people’s registered data, 
had said: “According to available information, 90% of people have declared their 
monthly income below IRR 10 million, 60% of whom setting their income at below 
IRR 6 million.”
On this basis, people may be classified under five categories:
 • Affluent people who gave up on subsidy receipt 
 • Affluent people who registered but honestly declared their income data
 • Affluent people who registered and provided fake data 
 • Needy people who registered 
 • And maybe needy people who gave up on subsidy receipt (This category may 
sound unreasonable and unlikely, but there is such record in Iranian society in 
the years leading to the Islamic Revolution and also during the 1980-1988 war 
with Iraq)
Here we ignore the second, fourth and fifth groups. The second group have 
honestly declared their income, but tried their chance for possible subsidy receipt 
without having any genuine expectation. The fourth and the fifth groups were really 
in need, and therefore they are not the subject of our study. 
The main focus of our study is the third group, who must be distinguished from 
the first and the second groups, who registered despite government expectations 
but were honest. However, the third group did not declare their real income and 
claimed to receive below IRR 25 million and have no private housing. Economically 
3  In a poll conducted by Iranian Student Polling Agency (ISPA) on April 28, 2014, 11.5 percent of respondents 
said they had withdrawn their application for monthly cash handouts, but the interesting point was that 7.8% 
said their registration failed. For 26.9% of the interviewees, the reason for registration was inflation and financial 
needs while another 26.9% highlighted people’s overall needs. For 10%, the reason was officials’ unnecessary 
expenditures and 5% said they did not trust government officials. Only 3.5% said their registration was for 
avarice and 60% agreed to the elimination of cash subsidy for high-income households. The important point 
is that six months before the poll was conducted, about 69% of respondents in Tehran had agreed to the 
elimination of subsidy for high-income families, which was down to 60% when the poll was conducted. It seems 
that after it was announced that in the second phase of subsidy reform plan, high-income families would be 
eliminated, some people who feared being placed on the list of high-incomes switched to opposition to the 
elimination of government subsidy for high-income households and consequently the number of proponents 
dropped. According to the poll, the self-styled low-income, middle-income and high-income individuals were 
not divided on agreement to the elimination of subsidy for high-income classes
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speaking, the first group has suffered maximum loss and the third group has made 
maximum gain. Therefore, the main question in this article is to know “what has been 
the methodology of decision-making by the third group (affluent people with fake 
data) based on the game theory?”
METHOD
This research followed a behavioral economy approach. This approach values 
psychological effect of men on the decision they will make. Among various 
methods, the prospect theory that proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) has 
found applicable to this research. In a study of risky choices, they modeled how 
people make decisions based on their valuation of loses and gains. Kahneman 
(2003) depicted the value function as figure 1 and proposes that this value function 
is “characterized by three features: 1) it is concave in the domain of losses, favoring 
risk aversion, 2) it is convex in the domain of losses, favoring risk seeking and 3) 
this function is sharply kinked at the reference point, and loss-averse steeper for 
losses than for gains by a factor.” (page 1456)
Figure 1: A Schematic Value Function for Changes (Kahneman, 2003)
Value
Losses Gains
 
Source: Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics. American 
economic review, 93(5), 1449-1475.
As it has been pointed out at the beginning of this paper, multiple prisoner’s 
dilemma game has been used as the method to investigate the reasons of responses 
to refuse to give up. To have a correct understanding, it is necessary to know 
Gains
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the prediction of people on the possible benefit and loss of this decision. Such 
understanding is the foundation of the matrix of profit-loss on the basis of game 
theory, and will help to know the reasons of such decision. 
To do this, an ethnographic research provides a ground to empathically catch 
the deep emotions and mindsets of sample of the research (Khajeheian, 2018). 
The researcher addresses the third group of people, the ones who lied about their 
economic situations to receive the direct financial aid. By use of two methods of 
available sampling and purposeful sampling, a number of such people were identified 
and get interviewed. Also the researcher, as a sociologist as well as an Iranian person 
who lives inside the society, used his experience and knowledge to systematically 
observe the people’s behaviors as well as to interview with them on the periods of 
registration to collect the required data. 
FINDINGS
Individual Economic Behavior Analysis Based on Profit-Loss Projections
Regardless of government behavior, some minor elements are involved in decision-
making by people, which may be analyzed based on the model of rational choice 
and game theory. In this model, the assumption is that people assess profits and 
losses of every behavior in order to choose an option that would benefit them the 
most. In order to better understand people’s behavior, first we produce a profit and 
loss account from the two behaviors of registration and non-registration for subsidy 
receipt. Table 1 is for those who applied for subsidy and Table 2 is for those who 
withdrew application for subsidy. 
In general, within the framework of the classic game theory, i.e. prisoner’s 
dilemma, individual decision-making based on others’ behavior may be classified as 
follows in terms of cooperation and defection:
 • Punishment: In this state, neither of subjects is cooperator and therefore both 
are deprived of advantages of cooperation and hence punished in one way or 
other. It is known as P or Dd (defection-defection). (Square 1)
 • Temptation: In this stage, one subject is defector and the other is cooperator. 
From a personal interest and economic rationality standpoint, this option is 
the best for any subject because it does not cooperate while benefiting from 
advantages of cooperation. That is known as free-riding because it is always 
intertwined with temptation and seduction. It is known as T or Dc (defection-
cooperation). (Square 2)
 • Sucker: In this stage, one subject is cooperator but the other subject is defector 
and even misuses the cooperator. The first subject is accused of being sucker. 
Therefore, this option is known as S or Cd (cooperation-defection). (Square 3)
 • Reward: In this stage, both subjects are cooperator and benefit from rewards of 
cooperation. This option is named R or Cc (cooperation-cooperation). (Square 4)
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Table 1. Profit and Loss Account (Registering for Subsidy)
Profit Loss People’s Assessment of 
Loss
IRR 455,000 per person
IRR 655,020,000 for four-
person household (at least 
until next presidential 
election)
Commodity prices grow after 
more subsidies scrapped
Prices will grow under any 
circumstances.
No use of public resources 
and formation of resources for 
development in Iran
 •  Mistrust of others’ 
cooperation
 •  Our money will never be 
spent on development. 
The government spends 
extravagantly every time it 
has more money.
I will be labelled as needy or 
greedy. 
 •  When money is valuable 
per se and not its 
acquisition this issue is not 
significant at all.
 •  Half a loaf better than 
nothing. This cash handout 
is enough for alms.
We will be fined and have to 
restitute the money.
Everyone is doing so and the 
government is not able to 
counter people.
Lying Studies show that religious 
issues rarely impact political 
and social life and people 
often justify their lies.
Non-receipt of loan or 
economic facilities
It is very unlikely to be 
implemented, just like all 
other state decisions to take 
action against economically 
corrupt persons.
Source: Authors’ work
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Table 2. Profit and Loss Account (Withdrawal of Application for Subsidy)
Loss Profit Assessment of Loss and 
Profit
Losing IRR 60 million for at 
least three years
Highly likely and even certain
Naivety and sucker feeling  •  We just lose money.
 •  The result is vendetta 
and opportunism in future 
occasions based on tit-for-
tat strategy.
Contribution to national 
development
 •  This money is practically 
squandered by managers. 
 •  The role of this money in 
national development is 
unclear and nobody knows 
where the saved money is 
spent4.
Economic Incentives No assessment provided by 
government
Peace of mind Such satisfaction wears 
out as feeling of naivety 
dominates.
Honesty Self-satisfaction
and 
afterworld reward
Source: Authors’ work
Although classic game theories often view a subject’s strategic behavior 
in interaction with “another subject”, in social games a subject may be seen in 
interaction with “other subjects”. Therefore, in a multiple prisoner’s dilemma where a 
subject is required to make decisions based on projections of decisions adopted by 
4  A group of 24 artists, 80 economists and 24 sociologists (including author of this article) signed a letter 
to President Hassan Rouhani on March 3, 2014 (one month before registration), withdrawing their own 
application for subsidy and demanding that revenue from withdrawals be spent on education of children in 
underprivileged areas; alas, it did not happen.
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other subjects (and not a single subject), or specifically in our case, whether or not 
register in www.refah.ir, whether or not provide wrong data or not (applying or not 
applying for subsidy receipt), Table 3 shows profit and income statement.
Table 3. Relationship between Region and Business Performance
Other Subjects’ Behavior
Defection:
Other subjects 
receive subsidy
Cooperation: Other 
subjects withdraw 
decision to receive 
subsidy
Subject’s Behavior Defection: receives 
subsidy
1 (punishment): bad 
economic conditions 
(shared loss) Dd
2(temptation): 
personal profit 
+improved economic 
conditions (shared 
profit) Dc
Cooperation: 
withdraws from 
subsidy receipt
3(sucker): personal 
loss + bad economic 
conditions (shared 
loss) Cd
4(reward): improved 
economic conditions 
(shared profit) Cc
Source: Authors’ work
Based on individual profit and loss calculations shown in Tables 1 and 2, a subject 
decides about registering or not for subsidy based on how other subjects behave. 
Preferences of a typical subject (Table 3) is about choosing to register for subsidy 
receipt while imagining that others are doing so (Square 1), in which case, the 
product is a collective loss because the government has to pay big sums in subsidy, 
which would inflict losses on everyone. But if this subject holds out the possibility 
that others may choose to withdraw their application for subsidy but deciding to 
register (Square 2), his assessment will be such that after other subjects’ withdrawal, 
economic conditions will improve while he would be able to benefit individually 
from this collective profit, which means gaining profits bigger than others. 
When a subject holding out the possibility of registration by others chooses to 
withdraw his application (Square 3) he will suffer collective loss because everyone 
has registered for subsidies. Furthermore, he suffers an individual loss because he is 
the only one to withdraw his application and has effectively lost subsidy. And finally 
if a subject withdraws application for subsidy and others do the same (Square 4), the 
released resources will be spent on national development and improving economic 
conditions. By ignoring a short-term profit, everyone will gain a bigger social profit. 
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Naturally the best option for everyone in the society would be a situation in which 
both a subject and others withdraw their application for subsidy receipt (Square 4), 
but in game theory-based elucidations if subjects consider themselves involved in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, Square 4 will no longer be sustainable equilibrium and everyone 
based on the “free-riding” logic will seek a way to receive the subsidy while others 
will withdraw their application (Square 2). Under such circumstances, everyone will 
register to receive subsidy (Square 1). Of course that is not the worst result because 
alongside us, others have also suffered losses. That is a shared loss and continuation 
of bad economic conditions, known as social dilemma. The worse option will be 
when a subject thinks he has been fooled into withdrawing from receiving subsidy 
while everyone else has registered for subsidy receipt. It means that a subject prefers 
to be D no matter others are c or d. therefore, DC or Dd is the choice of a subject 
when others become defector. The result will be Dd, which implies collective loss. 
In other words, by applying prisoner’s dilemma model and based on weak economic 
calculations, the dominant strategy will be the registration of majority of subjects in 
the society because all of them feel involved in a prisoner’s dilemma and not other 
games in which cooperation is more likely. 
This model is efficient on the grounds that it has been able to elucidate the behavior 
of majority of subjects in the society. In other words, the vast majority of people 
registered despite the government’s projections. In the final days of the deadline, 
the registration rate was higher because the last digit in national ID numbers has 
a normal distribution. The upward trend in the final days of registration stemmed 
from a change every subject felt in other subjects’ behavior, which convinced them to 
change their own behavior5. When the dominant atmosphere in the society is mutual 
trust and cooperation, others will be encouraged to be cooperator. But when they feel 
they suffer losses due to cooperation they become defector. (JavadiYeganeh, 2009)
The issue of shared profit and loss may be assessed under the title of “not losing 
the national asset”, which means safeguarding the existence of a collective asset or 
a common source or non-deterioration of the economy and slow-paced inflation, or 
opportunity for investment in a better future for public good. In this context, giving 
up on profit may be seen as investment in the development of a public good.
Until this section, my focus was on why subjects registered instead of responding 
positively to the government’s request and withdraw their application for subsidy. I 
also focused on economic calculations made by ordinary people who had registered 
because others had done so. Based on the dominant strategy in the prisoner’s 
dilemma game, it would be in the interest of a subject to be defector (in this case, 
registering for subsidy receipt) regardless of how others behave. 
This is part of behavioral corruption in the prisoner’s dilemma conditions, which 
result in collective loss while everyone was seeking maximum profit.
5 There is no data available on the trend of registration, but this possibility is held out based on figures 
announced for withdrawal during the first days of regist aration (7% to 10%) because the final rate of withdrawal 
was 3% and therefore withdrawal accelerated.
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Why Some Chose to Lie
The issue that triggered a tumult in the society was not the fact that most subjects in 
the society registered to enjoy profits from subsidy receipt. In a market society, the 
dominant rationale is maximum profit and any expectation of sacrifice from people 
is misplaced. In a society where wealth is practically praised and money is a solution 
to all problems, economic corruption and acquisitiveness by government employees 
are unveiled on a daily basis and embezzlements are in the order of billions. 
As I noted at the beginning of the article, when I speak about people in this study 
I do not mean those who need to receive government aid, rather I mean those who are 
considered as rich in conformity with government criteria and had been asked by the 
government to forego subsidies. Those rich persons who, despite the government’s 
request, were still applying for subsidy were behaving like Square 2 and those who 
forwent subsidies were behaving like Square 3 in the foregoing table. 
Avarice, excessive demand and seeking profit are not bad per se and are among 
characteristics of modern society in which, profits, jealousy and wrath have been 
rehabilitated in the form of wealth, political rivalry, violent sport matches and army. 
Profiteering, avarice and excessive demand have historical background in some 
segments of Iranian society. There is historical evidence on the extent of this issue. 
Therefore, those who had assessed themselves as rich based on government 
criteria and registered for subsidy receipt and of course entered real income data did 
not do any wrong act although they showed their greed. They are rich but they claim 
to need subsidies; however they did not lie. 
But the main issue is lying to gain profits. By lying we mean entering wrong data. 
We mean those who announced their income wrongly or refused to declare they owned 
a residential unit in the hope of making higher income6. Such an issue is expected to 
worry the moral conscience of the society because of the extent of such a big lie. 
The subject of this article is not to elucidate the reasons of lying in the Iranian 
society. Some pundits (Mohaddesi, 2009) have divided lies into three categories: 
lying as social grease to please others and facilitate relations with others in social 
interactions; lying as a way to escape punishment; and lying as a trap and arm for 
gaining profits. Iranian society is replete with the first and the second category, also 
known as white lie. Nonetheless, the lie uttered with regard to subsidy receipt was of 
the third category; lying in expressing income data for the intention of bigger profits 
and receipt of subsidy. 
Unfortunately lying is rife in Iranian society. Historical evidence is indicative of 
spread of lying due to insecurity and dictatorship. However, at the present time, most 
people believe that others are lying. In a recent opinion poll about social issues in 
Iran, which was conducted in April 2014 by the Iranian Students Polling Agency 
6 As it was mentioned, 50% of applicants had reportedly declared not having a residential unit while according 
to the National Statistic Center in 2011, only 26.6% of Iranians live in rented houses and 70% of Iranians have 
their own private housing or live gratuitously in a residential unit which is not theirs. Furthermore, an MP, asked 
about people’s registered data, had said: “According to available information, 90% of people have declared their 
monthly income below IRR 10 million, 60% of whom setting their income at below IRR 6 million.” 
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(ISPA), affiliated with the Academic Center for Education, Culture and Research, the 
residents of Tehran had given the rate 4.21 (on 1-5 scale) for the spread of lying in the 
city, and 2.76 among their own relatives. The rates stood respectively at 4.11 and 2.76 
for hypocrisy. And for the entire country, the rates were 3.56 and 2.52 for lying and 
3.43 and 2.46 for hypocrisy. 
Lying in Iran has historical roots, mainly emanating from long historical 
dictatorship and widespread insecurity. But according to the first narratives of 
Iranian society, it is concluded that this issue has been widespread. A famous prayer 
attributed to King Darius – “O Lord! Spare Persia Drought, Lie and Enemy Corps!” – 
shows lying was as harmful as drought and enemy troops at that time. Xenophon’s 
narrative of post-Cyrus time also bears proof to this issue. Dictatorial governments 
throughout Persian history have plundered people in a way or other. In addition to 
common ways of looting through war, pillage of sedentary people by tribes, levying up 
to 25% taxes and charging taxes for following years (which forced people to flee) and 
assigning people’s fate into the hands of rulers (by selling provincial governments 
and customs), there have been other ways of overcharging people particularly during 
the Qajar era. Some of them were the king’s presence at the residence of famous 
figures to receive rewards, the king’s presence in the bazaar and partnership with a 
tradesman in order to sell items to courtiers and merchants at much higher prices, 
seizure of decedent’s assets and confiscation of dissidents’ assets. 
Such policies made people to lose their trust in the government and always bear 
in mind Molavi’s poem that “Never speak about these three thing: Your destination, 
your gold (wealth) and your religion.” Therefore, it would not be reasonable to expect 
people to enter their true economic data to deny themselves an economic profit, 
particularly when there is no control tool to verify data. If during registration for 
subsidy receipt, citizens were assured that their data would be verified they would 
not give wrong response to the question about their wealth status. 
Meantime, based on Iranian dictatorship theory, “since all rights in Iran belong 
to government, so do all responsibilities” and citizens do not feel accountable about 
social issues. Furthermore, experience has shown that except for critical political 
cases, the government has always granted social and economic subsidies to people 
and never has anybody been punished for tax evasion or any other economic offense. 
Therefore, nobody is afraid of lying about his wealth status. 
And of course another issue is that those who receive subsidy are not be considered 
as wealthy and in people’s mind, not being recognized as wealthy mean capital security. 
Mistrust of government, coupled with avarice and lack of fear for government 
verification as well as interests of pretending to be poor, are micro-level reasons 
which caused so many Iranians to register for subsidy receipt.
And the conditions under which an ordinary actor had to choose to register or 
not stipulated a situation in which registration resulted in definite profit with low 
likelihood of loss while non-registration had likely low profit with definite loss. In 
other words, in such conditions, any ordinary person chose to register. Furthermore, 
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the experienced lived from no firm action against lies at such a level tempted people 
to register and lie. Therefore, the government placed the people in a situation of 
“temptation for registration” and “temptation for lying in registration”. When the 
conditions are conducive to avarice and lying, registration on such levels and lying 
on such scale are not unlikely.
The fallout of such a situation was the institutionalization of lies in the society with 
impunity for liars and the foregoers’ feeling of loss in addition to economic losses on 
the government due to paying subsidy to affluent groups. That caused people to no 
longer cooperate with the government. Meantime, non-fulfillment of pledges made 
by the government for punishing liars would further prove the inefficiency of the 
government for people.
Another worrying issue was people’s negligence of fatwas by religious leaders 
who had declared religiously forbidden any receipt of subsidy by affluent households. 
That would undermine the impact of edicts of supreme authority on religious 
matters, which should be studied independently.
Punishment of the Honest 
But there is also a flipside of the coin; a significant number of people who forwent 
subsidy receipt. Under conditions where honesty is labelled as sucker, a segment 
of people preferred to tell the truth just for the sake of moral value of honesty. They 
numbered 2.5 million. Their motivations may be studied so that causes of their 
withdrawal would be known. The issue of equity is not new regarding analysis of 
cooperative behavior in the global literature of social sciences. In his article “But 
Taxpayers Do Cooperate!”,Elffers (2000) concludes that equity (not on a large scale) 
is spreading at the global level, citing ultimatum and dictator games-based evidence. 
Equity may be gauged in the ultimatum and dictator games. In the ultimatum 
game, there are two players; Player One (proposer) disposes of sum furnished by the 
examiner and is authorized to determine the share of Player Two (responder). The 
proposals are as follows: all the money for Player One, the bulk, a small segment or 
nothing of the money for Player One. The responder may accept the first proposal 
and the sum will be divided between them. He may not accept and neither of parties 
will gain any money. The dictator game is similar to the ultimatum game with the 
difference that Player Two has no right and time to accept Player One’s proposal 
and the money will be imperatively divided based on Player One’s desire. That is 
why Player One is called dictator. The dictator can give as much money he wants to 
Player Two; nothing more, nothing less. 
For Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998), in the ultimatum game in the real word, if 
the proposer suggests less than 20% of the total sum to the responder, the proposal 
will be rejected. The likelihood for the acceptance of proposal is between 20% and 
30%. The predictable behavior of proposers is such that a significant segment of the 
total money will be divided, i.e. 40%-50%. This issue partly depends on the proposer’s 
equity and partly depends on his fear for reprisal in the ultimatum game. Most 
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dictators in the dictator game give a minimum portion to Player Two. In other words, 
most dictators show a minimum level of equity although the money received from 
them by Player Two may not be as much as proposed in the ultimatum game.
In Iranian society, there have been religious recommendations for sacrifice and 
forsaking personal interests for divine satisfaction, and bravery. Although many 
people have not been faithful to such causes they have always liked to be labelled 
such and that is why the bulk of people have always responded positively to requests 
of sacrifice and bravery. Examples have already been experienced in the years 
leading to the Islamic Revolution and during the Iraq-Iran War. But there is also 
another example in contemporary history, which was Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadeq’s appeal to people for loan at a time foreign governments, along with 
Britain, had imposed oil embargo on Iran. Iranians rushed to Mossadeq’s help by 
buying bonds and these were some people who set records; Haj Mohammad Jafar 
Kazerouni bought bonds for IRR 10 million in Isfahan or Hassan Shamshiri, owner of 
Shamshiri kebab, purchased bonds for IRR 5 million. 
Equity at such seemingly insignificant level is a big asset which must be used. At 
a time almost everyone is assured that others are lying and all economic calculations 
recommend that everyone register, this figure is significant and hopeful.
During the Iraq-Iran War, the families who sent their own children voluntarily to 
the frontline were not more numerous. 
Iran’s president heaped praise on sacrifices during registration in a televised 
interview, saying: “I also offer my gratitude to those who did not register or were 
not in need. Even though they were in need to some extent but they declined for the 
sake of more significant and national objectives. In coming months, it is possible for 
others to decline for the sake of more significant goals.”
In our view, in addition to the 2.5 million, those who registered but honestly 
declared their income (no data is available on their number) are appreciable although 
subsidy payment to them must be cut.
CONCLUSION
As it was mentioned, at the level of individual actors, under conditions where no effort 
is made for rewarding equity, lying is not punished, the government has no intention 
of reviewing people’s bank accounts and people hold the government responsible 
for everything, defining behavior as a “prisoner’s dilemma” in which the dominant 
strategy i.e. defection is not unexpected and it has been observed people have 
practically chosen this option. However, the game structure might have changed 
into chicken game or tit-for-tat, whose dominant strategy is cooperation. Some 
of approaches that could change the output’s structure and change the dominant 
strategy are as follows:
 • Instead of asking people whether or not they are “in need”, they should be 
asked to show sacrifice and give their share of subsidy to the needier groups 
despite their own needs.
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 • Global experiences about change in behavior and development of stable 
behavior (Mackenzie Moore, 2012) indicate the significance of commitment 
in behavioral changes. Therefore, widespread announcements by state 
managers failed to convince people to change mind and decline subsidy 
receipt. Such announcements are made only within the framework of state 
organs’ fulfillment of obligations and have no role in persuading people. 
There were sporadic cases of declining subsidy receipt. Announcements 
in which names have been singled out are very effective. Therefore, it is 
suggested that captivating notices be designed for declining subsidy receipt. 
Such signs would persuade people to decline subsidy because a person 
should not see conflict in his own behavior and belief. When he voluntarily 
bears a sign of decline he will transform it into action. 
 • Had the government cut the subsidy of affluent applicants who had honestly 
declared their wealth it would not have been labelled as sucker because of 
paying money to affluent groups amid economic woes. The next stage would 
be gradual identification of affluent people who registered but did not honestly 
declare their wealth. Failure to cut subsidy payment to this group equals spread 
of lying and will make those who honesty declared their wealth or bravely 
declined hopeless. Furthermore, the government should fulfill its pledge 
of forcing liars to restitute subsidy sums and pay fines equaling three times 
the subsidy value. Elimination can be gradual and the public opinion in the 
society will definitely not oppose cutting subsidy payment to affluent groups 
and there is nothing for the government to worry about. 
 • The government regularly reiterates that it does not investigate people’s 
banking accounts. That is while modern governments have been established 
based on the rationale that the entire society would be fully submissive to 
the government. Everyone is equally powerless before the government and 
the government controls the body and the spirit of people. A new theory 
developed by John Luck stripped the government of control over people’s 
assets; however, the government remains the sole legitimate authority in the 
society. Based on such logic, the government is required to do its utmost for 
safeguarding security. It has to control windfalls and hold their proprietors 
accountable in order to maintain economic health in the society. The 
opponents of the theory of government’s supervision over people’s assets 
will make maximum gain from economic anarchy. Therefore, the process 
of verifying people’s declarations must be implemented in order to bring 
economic and psychological security back to the society.
This is while supervising people’s accounts is common across the globe. Even 
US state officers regularly and unexpectedly refer to the residence of applicants 
of food stamp, enter in and control their belongings to see whether or not they 
deserve such government aid. 
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Therefore, the current situation in Iran shows defection is dominant. The situation 
cannot change by recommending equity and making publicity campaign. The only 
solution to improving the situation is to change the structure in favor of cooperation.
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